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HON. THOMAS A. BALMER*
A Life in the Law 
olmes asked himself––and all of us––how one could “live greatly 
in the law”: 
How can the laborious study of a dry and technical system, the greedy 
watch for clients and the practice of shopkeepers’ arts, the mannerless 
conflicts over often sordid interests, make out a life?1 
Well, one answer would be the varied career of Jack Landau, who, 
since he enrolled at Lewis & Clark Law School in 1977, has lived a 
rich and full “life in the law.” It is altogether fitting and proper that the 
Oregon Law Review should recognize Jack with this issue, including in 
it assorted tributes and Jack’s comprehensive article on statutory 
interpretation.  
Jack’s diverse experiences as a judicial clerk, a lawyer in private 
practice and public service, an academic, and an Oregon Court of 
Appeals and Supreme Court judge span much of the wide world of law, 
from the most quotidian tasks of a new associate working with a 
tiresome client on mundane business matters to arguing before the 
United States Supreme Court. But certain themes emerge from his 
almost forty years as a lawyer and judge: an organized and logical 
mind; a rare clarity of expression; a love of history, in its own right and 
as a tool for understanding––but never dictating––answers to legal 
questions; and an abiding commitment to judging and to the critical 
assessment of how appellate courts––and the Oregon courts in 
particular––decide cases. 
* Associate Justice, Oregon Supreme Court. A.B., Oberlin College, 1974; J.D.,
University of Chicago, 1977. 
1 O.W. HOLMES, THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW: CONCLUSION OF A LECTURE 
DELIVERED TO UNDERGRADUATES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY (1886), reprinted in O.W. 
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 29 (1921); see Thomas A. Balmer, Holmes on Law 
as a Business and a Profession, 42 J. LEGAL ED. 591 (1992).  
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Most of us can only wish for as organized and intentional a life as 
Jack has led. I will put to one side his (or, perhaps, Diane’s) household 
accounting acumen, where each paycheck is automatically allocated 
into different sinking funds for housing expenses, vacation, and 
retirement, or his methodical habits in caring for, and trading in at the 
optimal time, a series of fine cars. A monthly poker game, a quarterly 
dinner with friends, well-planned and thoughtfully scheduled 
vacations––the regularity of Jack’s life is something to behold. Closer 
to his work life, I have envied Jack’s clean desk, his hundreds of 
carefully shelved books (virtually all of which he actually has read), 
and his meticulous notes from oral arguments and post-argument 
conferences. It is no surprise that one of his earliest law review articles 
was an extended plea for teaching logic to first-year law students, in 
the hope that they could learn to apply the tools of logic to avoid fuzzy 
thinking and sloppy habits in reasoning and writing.2 
Jack’s writings, both as a judge and ex cathedra, are models of clear 
thinking and expression. One example is Young v. State of Oregon,3 a 
decision by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals that featured a 
unanimous ruling but three different opinions. The issue was the 
interpretation of a statute that the legislature adopted to provide 
overtime pay for certain state employees but, through a drafting 
mistake, also provided the extra compensation for a group of 
management-level employees that the legislature plainly had not 
intended to cover. The State refused to pay, and the management 
employees sued.4 In an opinion by Presiding Judge Paul De Muniz, the 
court of appeals held that the statute had to be applied as written, 
despite the general recognition that the legislature clearly had not 
intended it to apply to the management employees. In a concurring 
opinion, Judge Rick Haselton, Jack’s long-time friend and former 
private practice partner, issued a punchy, one-page retort, focusing on 
PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries,5 the controlling Supreme 
Court case. Essentially, PGE directed courts to focus on text and 
context when interpreting statutes and, only if the text was ambiguous, 
2 Jack L. Landau, Logic for Lawyers, 13 PAC. L.J. 59 (1981).  
3 161 Or. App. 32, 983 P.2d 1044 (1999). 
4 In the interest of full disclosure, I should acknowledge that both Jack and I were 
members of the putative class of management employees who should have received 
overtime compensation, but, if memory serves, neither of us received any damages when 
the plaintiffs eventually prevailed. Additional disclosure: I was the Oregon Deputy Attorney 
General (succeeding Jack in that position) during part of the time that the case was pending. 
5 317 Or. 606, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). 
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to consult or rely on legislative history. Judge Haselton’s concurrence 
begins:  
 PGE is authoritative. Accordingly, I concur. But only a fool or a 
knave would pretend that our result today bears any relationship to 
the legislature’s actual intent. 
 This case is just the latest, if perhaps the most egregious, of a 
series of cases in which fidelity to PGE has driven our court to 
patently silly results. Does anyone really believe that the 1995 
legislature intended to confer a multi-million dollar windfall on state 
white-collar employees? Of course not. Does PGE permit any other 
result? No.6 
On this important application of central principles of statutory 
interpretation, Jack, of course, had to respond, and he did so in an 
equally vigorous separate concurring opinion. 
 Judge Haselton suggests that this case is but the latest in a long 
line of “patently silly” decisions required by adherence to PGE . . . 
and calls for adoption of a rule that would permit courts to redraft 
statutes to effectuate apparent––but unexpressed––legislative 
intentions. . . . With respect, I think his proposal is ill-advised and 
that our decision is neither patently silly nor compelled by PGE. Our 
decision recognizes the uncontested fact that, in this case, the 
legislature made a significant mistake in its enactment of ORS 
279.340 and applies the long-acknowledged legal principle that we 
are unable to redraft a statute to remedy such a mistake.  
 PGE cannot be blamed for everything, certainly not for the 
inability of courts to redraft legislative enactments. The incapacity is 
compelled by ORS 174.010, which antedates PGE by some 150 
years.7  
Jack went on to root the principles of statutory interpretation adhered 
to by the Oregon courts not just in prior court decisions and statutes, 
but more centrally in the separation of powers and the structure of the 
Oregon Constitution.  
By constitutional definition, legislation consists of language reduced 
to writing and approved by two houses of the Legislative Assembly 
and the governor (or, if the governor does not approve, a veto 
override by both houses). Or Const. Art IV, § 25, Art V, § 15b. 
Legislative intentions that have not been reduced to writing and 
subject to the constitutional approval process are not law, and for the 
6 Young, 161 Or. App. at 42, 983 P.2d at 1050 (Haselton, J., concurring). 
7 Id. at 40, 983 P.2d at 1049 (Landau, J., concurring). 
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judiciary to give legal effect to such inchoate intentions would 
amount to an end-run around the constitutional enactment process.8  
His concurring opinion in Young is classic Jack Landau: direct and 
to the point; sometimes colorful; always grounded in constitutional and 
statutory principles and text; cognizant that the legislative and 
executive branches, not just the judicial branch, play key roles in state 
government and the legal system. Young––a case viewed as so 
significant that Attorney General Hardy Myers argued it personally––
also illustrates Jack’s willingness (and that of Judges De Muniz and 
Haselton) to follow the law and the better analytical path, even if the 
result was unsettling to important constituencies.  
Another such case was Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences 
University,9 where Jack’s opinion for the court of appeals broke 
important ground in ensuring equal rights for gays and lesbians. The 
novelty and political impact of the case were irrelevant to Jack’s 
analysis and conclusion, although it was that context that made the 
opinion the subject of national media attention. Without hyperbole or 
rhetorical excess, Jack dispassionately analyzed the claims of gay and 
lesbian employees of Oregon Health Sciences University (OHSU) that 
its denial of insurance benefits to their same-sex domestic partners was 
unlawful. He rejected various procedural objections by the State and 
the argument that the policy violated state statutes prohibiting sex 
discrimination in employment. His opinion for the court held, however, 
that the policy was a straightforward violation of Article I, section 20, 
of the Oregon Constitution, which prohibits laws that grant “to any 
citizen or class of citizens privileges and immunities, which, upon the 
same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” The “equal 
privileges and immunities” provision, the Oregon courts had 
previously held, prohibited the government from treating certain 
groups of people, defined by race, gender, or similar characteristics, 
less favorably than other groups. OHSU argued that it did not treat 
homosexual employees less favorably than others; rather, it said, 
eligibility for insurance benefits was determined on the basis of marital 
status, not sexual orientation, and such a classification was permissible. 
Any discrimination was not the result of OHSU’s policy, it argued, but 
of the State’s prohibition on same-sex marriage, which, it 
8 Id. at 40–41, 983 P.2d at 1049. 
9 157 Or. App. 502, 971 P.2d 435 (1998). 
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acknowledged, had the effect of preventing homosexual employees 
from obtaining insurance for their same-sex partners. 
 Jack’s opinion for the court rejected this defense. OHSU’s “facially 
neutral classification” had the unintended side effect of discriminating 
against same-sex couples, because they were not allowed to marry.10 
He noted that the equal privileges and immunities provision did not 
prohibit only intentional discrimination and then turned to the ultimate 
question under Article I, section 20. 
OHSU insists that in this case privileges and immunities are available 
to all on equal terms: All married employees––heterosexual and 
homosexual alike––are permitted to acquire insurance benefits for 
their spouses. That reasoning misses the point, however. Homosexual 
couples may not marry. Accordingly, the benefits are not made 
available on equal terms. They are made available on terms that, for 
gay and lesbian couples, are a legal impossibility.11 
Jack’s opinion in Tanner followed oft-stated principles of statutory 
and constitutional construction. Moreover, particularly in its handling 
of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claim, it managed to turn a potentially 
difficult and politically fraught issue into a syllogism that led to an 
ineluctable logical conclusion. But that elegant logic was informed by 
an understanding of the real-world interaction between changing social 
mores, the marriage statutes, and the Oregon Constitution. Jack brought 
both of those sensibilities to this thoughtful, correct, and instantly 
accepted opinion. 
Many of Jack’s opinions for the Supreme Court were equally 
noteworthy, but some of his most thoughtful––and, potentially, 
consequential––opinions were concurrences, where he was freer to 
express his own views about legal issues that the majority had decided 
not to address. In State v. Hemenway,12 for example, he agreed with the 
majority in a search and seizure case under Article I, section 9, of the 
Oregon Constitution and with the majority’s rejection of a request by 
the State that the court reexamine its search and seizure cases in light 
of the original intent of the framers of the constitution. He wrote 
separately, however, to highlight his disagreement with earlier cases 
cited by the State in which the court had suggested that it should (and 
that it could) apply constitutional provisions as they had been intended 
10 Id. at 524, 971 P.2d at 447. 
11 Id. at 525, 971 P.2d at 448. 
12 353 Or. 129, 154, 295 P.3d 617, 632 (2013) (Landau, J., concurring) vac’d 353 Or. 
498, 302 P.3d 413 (2013); see also Jack L. Landau, The Search for the Meaning of Oregon’s 
Search and Seizure Clause, 87 OR. L. REV. 819 (2008). 
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by the members of the constitutional convention in 1857, or by the 
voters who had approved the constitution that year: “In my view, the 
idea that the original state constitution means no more than what it 
meant to its framers in 1857 is untenable.”13 He went on to explain the 
absence of any suggestion from the framers that they intended the 
document to be so construed; the lack of any indication as to what their 
intent might have been as to the many provisions that were discussed 
only briefly, if at all, at the constitutional convention; and the general 
and sometimes vague words and phrases that were often used.14 Not 
only was original intent an incorrect approach in most cases but it often 
was difficult to apply, including with respect to Article I, section 9.  
Jack also concurred in two important cases interpreting the remedy 
clause, Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution: Klutschkowski 
v. PeaceHealth,15 and Horton v. Oregon Health Sciences University.16
Both cases involved tort claims and the issue of whether a legislative
limit on noneconomic damages for certain torts violated the
constitutional edict that “every man shall have remedy by due course
of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation.”17
Jack used those concurrences to explain his views on stare decisis,
constitutional interpretation, and the use of history generally. Those
views––well thought-out, informed but not dictated by historical
research––have been and will continue to be cited and followed by
Jack’s successors on the Oregon appellate courts for years to come.
But Jack Landau’s thinking about statutory and constitutional 
interpretation has an audience––and an influence––beyond Oregon 
lawyers pursing their clients’ interests in Oregon courts. The mantle of 
Hans Linde, the undisputed leader and intellectual founder of modern 
state constitutional law, has been passed to a pair of accomplished 
judges and scholars, Jack Landau and David Schuman. Despite their 
work on busy appellate courts, Jack and David followed in Linde’s 
footsteps, explaining Oregon law, and state constitutional law 
principles generally, through law review articles, lectures, and 
symposia. Two of Jack’s articles in particular––parts of his LL.M. 
thesis at the University of Virginia Law School––have been cited 
frequently in many briefs and court opinions and by other scholars. 
13 353 Or. at 156, 295 P.3d at 633.  
14 Id. at 156–58, 295 P.3d at 633–35. 
15 354 Or. 150, 177, 311 P.3d 461 (2013) (Landau, J., concurring). 
16 359 Or. 168, 254, 376 P.3d 998 (2016) (Landau, J., concurring). 
17 OR. CONST. art. I, §10.  
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Some Observations About Statutory Construction in Oregon,18 which 
appeared in the Willamette Law Review in 1996, was the basis for 
much later work, by Jack and others, including the article that appears 
in this issue. A close reader of Oregon cases interpreting statutes––
which, as Jack observed in the article, is the largest single category of 
cases decided by the Oregon appellate courts––will see the article’s 
influence on dozens of opinions from the Oregon courts––and not just 
those that Jack wrote! His analysis of Oregon constitutional law as it 
emerged, cultivated by Linde and others, in the last decades of the 
twentieth century, Hurrah for Revolution: A Critical Assessment of 
State Constitutional Interpretation,19 is a systematic analysis of the 
strengths and weaknesses of Oregon’s approach to constitutional law. 
If the article succeeds as an exposition and critique of Oregon’s 
developing constitutional law and is less compelling in offering 
alternative approaches to the problems and inconsistencies it identifies, 
that barely diminishes its impressive contribution to the debate over 
competing principles of state constitutional interpretation. 
Over almost four decades as a lawyer, judge, teacher, and legal 
scholar, Jack Landau has helped to shape Oregon law. His work has 
given judges and lawyers here something that many states lack––
thoughtful, sustained, scholarly assessment of state court opinions and 
the development of state law. Jack’s ongoing teaching and writing, as 
well as his existing opus of articles and opinions, will ensure that his 
thoughtful analysis and clearly articulated positions will be consulted 
and relied upon by the legal community for decades to come. That is 
surely enough to answer in the affirmative Holmes’s question of 
whether one can “make out a life”––and even “live greatly”––in the 
law. 
18 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1 (1996). 
19 79 OR. L. REV. 793 (2000). 
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